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end-to-end argument conceptpaper

Saltzer/Reed/Clark (1984): functions like reliability, encryption, and acknowledgment can only be fully implemented at the endpoints.

Saltzer/Reed/Clark (1984): functions like reliability, encryption, and acknowledgment can only be fully implemented at the endpoints. Implementing them in the network is at best optimization, at worst harmful — it adds complexity and creates a false sense of security without removing the need for the endpoint version. Foundational to internet design. Applied broadly: end-to-end checks (idempotency keys, business-level reconciliation) beat per-hop guarantees when the failure modes you care about cross multiple hops.

see also

• idempotency
• fallacies-of-distributed-computing
• saga

topics: computer-science, architecture, distributed-systems

references:

• Saltzer, Reed, Clark — End-to-End Arguments in System Design